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Strict federal regulations govern the possession,
use, and transfer of pathogens and toxins with potential to
cause harm to the public, either through accidental or
deliberate means. Laboratories registered through either
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS), or both, must prepare
biosafety, security, and incident response plans, conduct
drills or exercises on an annual basis, and update plans
accordingly. At the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), biosafety,
laboratory, and emergency management staff have been
working together to satisfy federal and U.S. Dept. of
Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) requirements. This has been done through the
establishment of plans, training, tabletop and walk-
through exercises and drills, and coordination with local
and regional emergency response personnel. Responding
to the release of infectious agents or toxins is challenging,
but through familiarization with the nature of the
hazardous biological substances or organisms, and
integration with laboratory-wide emergency response
procedures, credible scenarios are being used to evaluate
our ability to protect workers, the public, and the
environment from agents we must work with to provide
for national biodefense.
I. INTRODUCTION
The DOE/NNSA national laboratories across the U.S.
have a long history supporting technology development to
ensure our nation’s security. Prior to the anthrax events
of 2001 (sometimes called “Amerithrax”) the national
labs were already at work on detection and
countermeasures for biological warfare and bioterrorism.
This work has frequently required at least the incidental
use of live biological agents or toxins that are currently
governed by federal regulations and DOE directives. It is
important to note, however, that at a fundamental level,
the national labs employ well-accepted practices and
philosophies for safe work and emergency response
related to controlling exposure to etiologic (disease-
causing) biological agents that are part of the biological
safety discipline. This paper will describe the integration
of biological safety (biosafety) and emergency planning at
two DOE/NNSA national laboratories working with
federally-regulated select agents.
II. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
SURROUNDING WORK WITH SELECT AGENTS
Etiologic agents and toxins that are considered to
pose a severe threat to human, animal, and/or plant health,
and that can “be used as weapons by individuals or
organizations for the purpose of domestic or international
terrorism or for other criminal purpose” have been
classified as select agents and toxins1. Prior to 2001 and
the enactment of the USA Patriot Act, etiologic agents
were regulated primarily with respect to interstate
shipment2. In response to the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 19963, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) proposed changes to the
federal regulation, creating for the first time, a list of
select agents4 and requiring registration of facilities
transferring or receiving select agents. By incorporation
into the regulation, the guidelines provided in the CDC
publication Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical
Laboratories (BMBL)5 became legal requirements of
registered facilities in January, 2002.
After the Amerithrax incidents in 2001, Congress
enacted additional legislation that in part, focused on
future prevention of similar bioterrorism acts. The USA
Patriot Act and the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 20026 in
particular legislated provisions requiring HHS and APHIS
to enhance regulations controlling access to select agents.
The end result are the current regulations governing select
agent and toxin use (hereafter referred to as 42 CFR
73)7,8. An updated 5th edition of the BMBL has also been
released on-line9. At the time this manuscript was
prepared, however, inspectors were still using the 4th
edition to evaluate compliance.
DOE/NNSA has also been concerned about the
expansion of research and development activities across
the national lab complex utilizing select agents. In 2001,
DOE/NNSA’s Office of Worker Protection Policy issued
DOE Notice 450.710, requiring DOE contractors to
comply with applicable regulations, establish institutional
biosafety committees (IBCs; note that IBCs have
traditionally been required at academic institutions to
oversee recombinant DNA research receiving support
from NIH, but are being tasked with independent review
of work with biohazards with increasing frequency),
implement best practices, with specific reference to the
BMBL, establish immunization policies based on HHS
recommendations, and other administrative requirements
designed to ensure that the responsible DOE field
elements were aware of the work and agents in use. This
notice was extended until 2006, at which time the
requirements were largely incorporated into DOE’s
Worker Safety and Health Program (also a federal
regulation)11.
The emergency planning aspects of compliance with
42 CFR 73 (§73.14, Incident Response) were
incorporated into the comprehensive, all-hazards
emergency management requirements for DOE/NNSA
facilities with the issuance of DOE Order 151.1C,
Comprehensive Emergency Management System12. A
separate Emergency Management Guide13 has also been
issued to assist site emergency management personnel in
planning for and appropriately managing biological
hazards including select agents and toxins.
III. THE BIOSAFETY DISCIPLINE PROVIDES AN
APPROACH TO SAFE WORK WITH SELECT
AGENTS
One could argue that biosafety practices have been
developed and refined since the pioneering work of Louis
Pasteur in the 19th century. Effective biosafety involves a
tiered approach to controlling and containing infectious
agents, starting with the laboratory worker (laboratorian
in CDC vernacular) and their practices and procedures.
These practices should be designed to minimize the
potential for release of infectious materials into the
workplace, and exposure of personnel. The BMBL
requires that such practices be documented in a lab-
specific biosafety plan. Personal protective equipment
(PPE) is selected to provide barriers to immediate
exposure to spills or splashes, and depending on routes of
exposure and infectious potential of the agent(s), may
include respiratory protection or even full containment
suits. Engineered controls such as biosafety cabinets
(BSC: HEPA filtered cabinets, the most common of
which will provide both worker and material protection),
negative air pressure lab environments, antechambers and
showers, and HEPA-filtered room exhaust systems
provide additional assurance that potential spills or other
releases would be contained to the affected laboratory.
Finally, administrative controls, including access
restrictions, escort requirements, vaccination policies, and
others, ensure that exposure risk is limited as much as
possible to trained personnel who are further protected by
available vaccines and undergo additional health
surveillance. Most readers will be familiar with the
biocontainment levels associated with use of potentially
infectious materials, ranging from biosafety level 1 to 4
(BSL-1to 4), and roughly corresponding to the relative
risk of agents that may be employed at each level, from
posing little or no risk to healthy individuals (BSL-1) to
agents with no available prophylaxis or treatment, and
likely to cause significant mortality or morbidity, often
with unknown routes of transmission (BSL-4). It should
be noted that operations conducted at each respective
biosafety level include selection of appropriate practices,
procedures, PPE, engineering, and administrative
controls, and that it is the aggregate of these controls,
rather than any single control, that defines the
containment level. Selection of the appropriate
biocontainment level is also dependent on several factors,
including the infectious potential of the agent in question,
the severity of disease, persistence/survival upon release,
available countermeasures, and the nature of the work to
be performed with the agent.
The purpose of this brief discourse on principles of
biosafety is to demonstrate that under normal
circumstances, there are multiple controls in effect to
protect workers, the public, and the environment from
accidental release of infectious agents, and some
protection in the event of an off-normal event.
Laboratory design features, such as inward-flowing air
exhausted through dedicated exhaust stacks and HEPA
filters, commonly found in BSL-3 and –4 laboratory
facilities, can be important components of biocontainment
labs providing additional assurance in the case of lab
accidents. However, catastrophic events may have the
potential to breach even the most robust engineered
containment, and the possibility of deliberate, intentional
release by action of individuals or organizations must now
also be considered.
IV. PLANS, TRAINING, TABLETOP AND WALK-
THROUGH EXERCISES AND DRILLS, AND
COORDINATION WITH LOCAL AND REGIONAL
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL.
Exercises and drills at INL and LANL have proven to
be extremely beneficial in several ways. First, they meet
regulatory requirements for select agent and DOE
requirements for emergency drills and exercises. Second,
they provide a no-fault environment where exercise
participants have the ability to assess, identify, openly
discuss, train, and learn their respective emergency
response capabilities to provide support during an
emergency biological incident. Lastly, they assist
research, facility, and safety personnel in the development
of short and long range improvement plans. The
progression from table top, to focused drills, to limited or
full site exercises provides opportunity at each step to
further improve processes. This results in better
preparation should an actual emergency occur.
IV.A. IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY DRILLS
AND EXERCISES
Emergency planning for biocontainment facilities at
the INL has required coordination with both internal and
external organizations from the outset, because first
response at these facilities is currently the responsibility
of our local fire municipal department. This means that
unlike many emergencies (even at our own site) where
DOE facilities are largely self-sufficient with respect to
emergency response, a local agency is likely to control the
initial emergency through the incident command system.
We engaged first responders, regional hazardous
materials (hazmat) teams, public health, site protective
forces, technical subject matter experts, facility engineers,
and emergency planners as we created the first detailed
incident response plan necessary to comply with 42 CFR
73. Since that first meeting, where a draft of the proposed
incident response plan was used to talk through an
emergency scenario and evaluate what might be missing
or improved, several walk-through drills and one multi-
agency, full dress response exercise have been conducted.
Each one has identified responses and interactions that
can be improved, but each one has also increased the
confidence of the respective agencies in understanding the
nature of the scenarios, and their ability to respond.
Any emergency scenario involving select agents
moves through a sequence of events initiated by the
determination that a release of some kind has occurred.
For select agents, that release can be the result of an off-
normal situation in the laboratory (spill, accident,
equipment disruption, power outage), an intentional
release resulting from criminal action, accidental or
intentional release, theft, or loss detected days or weeks
after the release event, or a catastrophic event resulting in
release and substantial destruction of the facility. Table I
provides a set of possible scenarios that can be used to
consider who needs to be involved, and what the proper
actions might be. A few of these examples will be
discussed further below incorporating some of the lessons
learned.
Table I. Example Off-normal Event Scenarios,
Players, and Response Actions
Event
Description
Likely
Participants
Actions
Lab spill Lab staff, RO,
occupational
medicine,
CDC, APHIS
Contain,
evacuate lab if
necessary;
determine if
additional
support is
necessary;
notify CDC or
APHIS if
primary
containment
barriers
breached;
monitor
exposed
employees;
evaluate value
of prophylaxis
Theft or Loss Lab staff, RO,
law
enforcement,
CDC, APHIS,
Notify CDC,
APHIS; if theft
is evident,
engage law
enforcement;
execute search
for missing
inventory with
lab staff
Disease
detected in
community
Lab staff, RO,
public health,
law
enforcement,
CDC, APHIS
Notify CDC,
APHIS (may
already be
involved);
determine if
event is result
of deliberate or
accidental
release; if
accidental,
begin systems
and process
evaluation to
determine
causes;
monitor at-risk
population;
evaluate value
of prophylaxis
Table I. Example Off-normal Event Scenarios,
Players, and Response Actions
Event
Description
Likely
Participants
Actions
Catastrophic
Release
Lab staff, RO,
facility
engineers, site
emergency
management,
fire
department,
law
enforcement,
regional
hazmat, public
health, CDC,
APHIS
Evacuate
during business
hours; account
for staff;
rescue if
necessary;
establish
decon; contain
building
systems; notify
CDC, APHIS;
estimate
amount of
release and
protective
actions; assess
extent of
contamination;
initiate law
enforcement
investigation if
necessary;
establish
restoration and
recovery plan
after
stabilization;
monitor at-risk
population;
evaluate value
of prophylaxis
Disgruntled
employee
steals and
releases agent
Lab staff, RO,
law
enforcement,
CDC, APHIS,
public health
Notify CDC,
APHIS;
estimate
amount of
release and
population at
risk; contain
and
decontaminate
if possible;
initiate
investigation;
monitor at-risk
population;
evaluate value
of prophylaxis
For laboratory incidents (assuming the event occurs
during the course of normal activities), training of the
laboratory worker to take immediate actions to contain
and inactivate the agent if possible is of paramount
importance. Proper training, practices, and procedures are
obviously critical. Recognition of events that would
exceed the capabilities of the individual worker or team to
deal with is also important, and as in any emergency, life
protection must supercede any other protective actions.
Exposed personnel should be isolated for
decontamination, and identified for medical evaluation,
follow-on monitoring, and need for prophylaxis. First
responders should have been called in if the situation
warranted (medical emergency, fire, or explosion
impacting a biocontainment lab, for example). At this
point, additional support can be called upon, depending
on the nature of the event. Should a release breach the
secondary biocontainment barriers, site emergency
management plans coordinated with DOE/NNSA
headquarters are activated, leading to the declaration of an
unclassified Operational Emergency (OE).
42 CFR 73 mandates that the facility Responsible
Official (RO) or designee (many facilities have alternate
ROs) be involved to support emergency actions, and
notify the appropriate regulatory agency (CDC or
APHIS), law enforcement, and public health agencies as
necessary. Therefore, a quick assessment as to the nature
of the select agent emergency can identify the outside
agencies that will need to be notified beyond those that
might be engaged in any DOE operational emergency.
The appropriate regulatory agency must also be notified
immediately in the event of an occupational exposure, or
release beyond the primary barriers of the biocontainment
area (42 CFR §73.19(b).
From Table 1, it can be seen that lab staff and the
RO will have involvement in virtually every scenario, if
for no other reason than they possess the best knowledge
of what agents are involved and how much agent might
have been released (perhaps one of the most difficult
challenges, as current models of biological agent dispersal
are based upon a large quantity of infectious material or
toxin being released, rather than considering an accidental
release from a building with complex spaces and
ventilation paths).
In the case of the INL, first responders will arrive
within minutes after notification, and establish an incident
command post. With the information that a biological
incident has occurred, the regional hazmat team will be
called in to support the municipal fire department,
including equipment for decontamination of personnel,
and response staff with PPE better suited to the demands
of a biological event. These teams would be called into
play after rescue and fire abatement activities are
concluded and the facility is deemed safe for emergency
personnel re-entry.
Deliberate events will also result in a substantial law
enforcement role, and add additional chain of custody
issues to any necessary environmental sampling that
might be conducted to assess the extent of contamination
or boundaries of an event. Site protective forces and local
law enforcement will likely be engaged from the outset of
any emergency to control traffic and site access, but
intentional release of select agents is by definition a
federal crime, so regional and national law enforcement
personnel will respond as well when circumstances
dictate.
Should the on scene assessment indicate that a
substantial release has occurred, it is likely that infectious
materials will have moved beyond the facility boundaries,
in which case the incident commander will need
information to determine if evacuation of other workers or
the public is warranted. Public health should also be
engaged in considering the nature of the agent involved,
and what community health surveillance and/or
prophylaxis they would direct. These actions are not
under the control of DOE, and may also be supported
with national resources from CDC or APHIS.
After the event has been stabilized, determination of
the extent of contamination and need for decontamination
must be made. This can be difficult since the capabilities
for sensitive detection of biological agents and the
appropriate facilities in which to perform such analyses
may have been compromised by the event itself. All state
public health labs are members of the CDC Laboratory
Response Network (LRN)14, and receive training and
undergo proficiency testing to identify many select
agents. However, those labs may be hours away from the
incident scene, so pre-planning for the types of agents that
might be involved is an important consideration for
emergency preparedness.
It is evident from this brief analysis of a few potential
emergency scenarios that there are some incidents that
will be well within the abilities of immediate lab staff to
deal with, while situations in which catastrophic damage
has occurred to facilities as a result of fire or explosion
may engage substantial resources beyond the DOE/NNSA
facilities themselves. Even natural disasters, such as
Hurricane Katrina, affected select agent laboratories,
requiring interagency coordination to determine a proper
course of action to contain the biological threat. The need
for adequate pre-planning for emergencies, as required
by 42 CFR 73 and applicable DOE directives is clear.
Our drills and exercises have also highlighted the
importance of engaging all agencies that might have a
role in the eventual response so that roles and
responsibilities are understood, and to ensure that lines of
communication are established well before any real
emergency.
IV.B. LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY
DRILLS AND EXERCISES
Table top exercises, drills, and full scale exercises at
LANL with specific focus on biological hazards have
resulted in identification of strengths, as well as
opportunities for improvement for emergency response to
these types of emergencies.
Emergency Operations at LANL also benefit from
having personnel with biosafety expertise within the
Emergency Operations Center to communicate directly
with incident command and hazmat personnel in the field
regarding potential exposure routes, environmental
sampling techniques, decontamination procedures and
personal protective equipment specific to an organism.
V. SUMMARY
The biosafety discipline provides an approach to safe
work with select agents. It also provides emergency
operations personnel with a framework to identify,
evaluate, and control exposures to biological agents in the
event of an actual emergency involving a biological
agent. Plans, training, tabletop and walk-through
exercises and drills, and coordination with local and
regional emergency response personnel provide an
excellent opportunity for a facility to identify strengths
and opportunities for improvement in emergency response
to biological incidents.
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